Gettier Cases Gettier Cases are scenarios that were presented by Edmund Gettier where he demonstrated justified beliefs that failed the test of genuine knowledge. So for example prior to Gettier philosophers would reason that you only had knowledge of P iff (1) P is true (2) you believe P (3) you poses justifiable evidence for P. One of the common Gettier cases is,
You have a justified belief that someone in your office owns a Ford. And as it happens it’s true that someone in your office owns a Ford. However, your evidence for your belief all concerns Nogot, who as it turns out owns no Ford. Your belief that someone in the office owns a Ford is true because someone else in the office owns a Ford. Call this guy Haveit. Since all your evidence concerns Nogot and not Haveit, it seems, intuitively, that you don’t know that someone in your office owns a Ford. So you don’t know, even though you have a justified belief that someone owns a Ford, and, as it turns out, this belief happens to be true.
The problem in this case comes up because in order to know that someone in your office owns a Ford you must have absolute certainty or it ceases to be true knowledge. Do you see the problem here? If true knowledge required absolute certainty there would be precious little that we can claim to know. Some who have taken on these Gettier Cases have tended to argue from the position of either fallible or defensible evidence. As you can probably imagine there is much more to say about attacking Gettier Cases and if I come across a good approach I’ll be sure to post it. In the mean time you can hone up on Gettier by clicking the link below.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? By Edmund Gettier
Plantinga received a research grant from the Ammonius Foundation to write on the subject of naturalism and objective morality. The completed paper is out and published in Faith & Philosophy (vol. 27, no. 3 (2010)). If you are interested you can find Plantinga’s paper entitled Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience by clicking the link. I haven’t had the opportunity to read the paper completely but Plantinga argues that naturalism does not accommodate moral theorizing.
This is the third in a series of interviews about religion that I am conducting for The Stone. The interviewee for this installment is John D. Caputo, a professor of religion and humanities at Syracuse University and the author of “The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion.”
You can read this interview here . Depending on your background you might look at this interview as mindless quibble or an interesting example of Deconstruction. I will begin by saying that Caputo is not one for pointless games but is a serious philosopher and is seriously articulating the outcome of his Deconstruction on his religious faith.
Deconstruction is one of those topics that is hard to articulate and the moment you make a definitive statement about it you have just negated it. See what I mean?
Think for a moment about any claim that one would make. “It is dark outside”. That claim has meaning to us in so far as it relates to the outside when its light out. Statements tend to have this binary oposition to one another and most often the former is preferred over the latter. So for example, “good” / “bad”, “truth” / “false”, “right” / “wrong”. What if these binaries didn’t exist or were “Deconstructed”. This is what Caputo is getting at when he says things like, “After making a distinction in deconstruction, the first thing to do is to deconstruct it, to show that it leaks, that its terms are porous and intersecting, one side bleeding into the other, these leaks being the most interesting thing of all about the distinction.”
What I see as problematic in this interview is the assumption that God can be deconstructed. Obviously this depends on what we mean by “God”. In other words, it is possible to generate a conception of deity that is less than God and more like a figment of our imagination. In such a case deconstruction is very possible. Caputo didn’t go into the type of deity he is referring to. Once he begins to qualify a deity for us then we have a better understanding of whether or not such a deity can be deconstructed.
Thinking about Aristotle and first philosophy can make one consider the many “first philosophies” she might poses and reason from (at least it does for me). We all come at reality with our governing presuppositions, but are they helpful to us? That is, do they help us in understanding reality or do the hinder our understanding?
Aristotle seems to believe that there is no difference between reality and logic. For Aristotle a logical view of reality is a true outlook on reality or even further, being. So the problem for Aristotle comes in when we talk about sub disciplines as first philosophy. Sub disciplines are limited in their field of comprehending reality. For example geometry’s concern with being is only in so far as it relates to space. Botany’s involvement in reality is restricted to nutrition and growth of plants.
Aristotle’s point is, there seems to be a lack of universality in these sub disciplines that doesn’t exist with logic. Logic along with being or reality exist universally and thus are understood by Aristotle to be first philosophies.
The WordPress.com stats helper monkeys prepared a 2014 annual report for this blog.
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A San Francisco cable car holds 60 people. This blog was viewed about 710 times in 2014. If it were a cable car, it would take about 12 trips to carry that many people.
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